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Executive Summary
Sustained economic and income growth, a fast­
growing urban population, and the increasing inte­
gration of global agri-food markets are fueling 
rapid growth in demand for high-value food com­
modities in India. This is an opportunity for 
farmers, especially smallholder farmers, in India to 
augment their incomes and use surplus family labor 
in the production of high-value, labor-intensive 
food commodities. The transition to high-value 
agriculture, however, is unlikely to be smooth. One 
of the major impediments is smallholders' lack of 
access to markets for high-value commodities. Local 
rural markets are thin, and trading in distant urban 
markets is not remunerative owing to high trans­
portation and transaction costs. Besides, they also 
face problems in gaining access to credit, high- 
quality inputs, improved technology, information, 
and services.
Improving smallholders' access to markets requires 
close linkages between farmers, processors, traders, 
and retailers to coordinate supply and demand. 
Institutions such as cooperatives, producers' associ­
ations, and contract farming are important means 
of linking producers with markets, as well as a 
source of credit, inputs, technology, information, 
and services. But there is concern that smallholders 
may be excluded from the institution-driven value 
chains. Agribusiness firms, to reduce the trans­
action costs of contracting with a large number of 
smallholders, have tended to contract with a few 
large producers who can supply large volumes and 
are capable of complying with food-quality stand­
ards. There is also a fear that agribusiness firms 
may exploit smallholders by extracting monop- 
sonistic rent in the output market and manipulating 
the terms and conditions of contracts.
Nonetheless, there is growing evidence that the 
advantages associated with institutional marketing 
outweigh its disadvantages. Policy makers should 
therefore create a level playing field to allow for 
the growth of the right kind of market institutions, 
promote competition among various market play­
ers and institutions, protect smallholders from in­
stitutional exclusion and unscrupulous trade prac­
tices, and support them with credit, insurance, 
technology, and services to improve their 
competitiveness and ensure food safety for con­
sumers. Policies should also focus on improving 
public infrastructure that generates widespread 
economic benefits.
Your assignment is [1] to compare advantages and 
disadvantages of cooperatives, producers' associa­
tions, and contract farming, and [2] to identify 
required government policies and other conditions 
for the success of these institutions, focusing on 
social, economic, and political and legal aspects.
Background
The Relevance of High-Value Agriculture to 
Smallholders
Smallholders1 are a big deal in India. In 2002/03, 
out of 101 million farm households, 86 percent had 
landholdings of less than or equal to two hectares 
[ha], with an average holding of 0.53 ha per house­
hold. Furthermore, smallholders are multiplying 
rapidly. Since 1971/72 their number increased 2.25 
times, whereas the average size of their holdings 
declined by 45 percent. How long can they survive 
on such tiny landholdings? Should they exit agri­
culture, or should they work to enhance their agri­
cultural income by intensifying or diversifying their 
production with more remunerative activities like 
horticulture, dairying, poultry, and fisheries? The 
opportunity to exit agriculture appears to be 
limited given that past trends for transferring labor 
from agriculture to other economic sectors are not 
encouraging. Between 1972/73 and 2004/05, the 
share of agricultural employment in total employ­
ment declined from 74 percent to 57 percent.
In view of the slow transfer of labor out of agri­
culture, diversification of agriculture out of staples
1 There is no universally accepted definition of small­
holders. Generally, farm classes are defined in terms of 
the amount of land or livestock a household possesses. 
Furthermore, the cut-off point for categorizing a farm 
household as a smallholder varies depending on the scar­
city or abundance of these resources. For more details, 
see Narayanan and Gulati (2002]. In India farm classifica­
tion is based on landholding size, and a household pos­
sessing less than two hectares of land is classified as a 
smallholder (see Government of India 2006],
and toward high-value food commodities appears 
to be an important pathway for smallholders to 
augment their income and escape poverty. High- 
value enterprises have strong potential to raise 
returns to land, labor, and capital inputs. Enter­
prises such as vegetable production and livestock 
rearing have short gestation or generation intervals 
and produce quick and continuous flows of output. 
Horticultural crops generate as much as seven 
times more income per unit of land compared with 
cereals (Joshi et al. 2004], Vegetable production 
requires two to seven times as much labor as 
cereals (Weinberger and Lumpkin 2005], and 
smallholders have abundant labor. There is also a 
possibility that labor may substitute for capital 
inputs—for example, manual weeding can replace 
the use of herbicides or tractors. Although high- 
value food production can require a greater 
amount of start-up capital, some activities, like 
vegetable production, small-scale dairying, and 
poultry raising, can be initiated and developed with 
relatively little capital.
Production of high-value commodities can make an 
important contribution to rural poverty reduction. 
The literature on the agriculture-poverty nexus 
identifies agricultural growth as the main cause of 
poverty reduction in many developing countries. In 
India the high-value food sector (fruits, vegetables, 
milk, meat, eggs, and fish] contributes nearly half 
of agricultural income and has been growing at 
almost twice the rate of the rest of the agricultural 
sector (Birthal and Joshi 2006], Besides, the distri­
bution of high-value enterprises such as dairying, 
poultry, and small ruminants is skewed toward 
smallholders, suggesting that high-value agriculture 
can make a significant contribution to poverty 
reduction. There are numerous other examples 
where smallholders could escape poverty through 
the production of high-value agricultural products.
Another significant feature of high-value agricul­
ture is that it is pro-women. Women perform a 
number of activities related to production and 
postharvest of high-value commodities. For 
instance, 76 percent of the labor required in dairy, 
62 percent in poultry, and 44 percent in horti­
cultural production in India is supplied by women, 
compared with 37 percent in the case of foodgrains 
(Birthal et al. 2006], Similar situations have been 
documented in many developing countries (Dolan 
and Sorby 2003],
Market Opportunities in High-Value 
Agriculture
Demand for high-value food production in the 
domestic as well as international markets has been 
increasing rapidly. The food basket in India has 
undergone a significant change over the past two 
decades or so. Between 1983 and 1999, per capita 
consumption of high-value food products increased 
by 24 to 39 percent, compared with a 16 percent 
decline in cereal consumption (Mittal 2006], 
Furthermore, this shift in the consumption pattern 
is not confined to high-income consumers, but is 
widespread. The percentage increase in the con­
sumption of high-value food commodities has been 
higher among households at the lower end of the 
income distribution, owing to Engel's Law. Multi­
plying these changes by the rise in population 
translates into huge increments in demand growth 
for high-value food products.
The growth in domestic demand for high-value 
food products was triggered by rapid economic 
and income growth, increasing urbanization, 
changing consumer preferences, and unfolding 
globalization (Birthal et al. 2006], For the past two 
decades the Indian economy has been growing at 
an annual rate of more than 6 percent, per capita 
income at 4 percent, and the urban population at 3 
percent. These economic and demographic changes 
are considered robust and are likely to continue in 
the near future, implying further expansion in the 
demand for high-value food products.
The global market for high-value food commodities 
is also expanding fast (Aksoy and Beghin 2005], 
The share of fruits and vegetables in world agricul­
tural trade, for example, increased from 14 percent 
in 1981 to 19 percent in 2003. In India high-value 
food products (fruits, vegetables, dairy products, 
meat, eggs, and fish] accounted for 35 percent of 
total agricultural exports in 2003, up from 24 
percent in 1981 (Birthal et al. 2006], Fish and fish 
products are the largest component of high-value 
exports (50 percent], followed by fruits and vege­
tables (35 percent]. Annual growth of high-value 
food exports during this period was 4.4 percent, 
compared with 3.5 percent in total agricultural 
exports. The faster growth in exports of high-value 
food products presents an opportunity for small­
holders to participate in global markets.
Barriers to Smallholders' Access to Markets
Can smallholders benefit from the expanding 
markets for high-value food commodities? The 
production and marketing requirements for high- 
value food commodities are much different than 
for staple foods. Production of most high-value 
food commodities is capital and information inten­
sive, and because these products are perishable, 
they are prone to higher market and price risks. 
Moreover, smallholders are constrained by a lack 
of access to capital or credit, improved tech­
nologies, high-quality inputs, information, services, 
and risk-mitigating mechanisms.
Lack of access to markets for high-value food 
commodities is a major impediment to small farm 
diversification toward high-value food commodities. 
The perishability of high-value food commodities 
necessitates their immediate transfer to consump­
tion centers or markets or transformation into less 
perishable products. Local rural markets for high- 
value food commodities are thin, and the market­
able surplus of individual smallholders is too small 
to be traded economically in distant urban markets 
owing to high transportation and transaction costs. 
The transportation and marketing costs associated 
with open market sales of milk and vegetables in 
India eat up as much as 15 percent of farmers' gross 
revenue [Birthal et al. 2005], Some of these costs 
are fixed and, owing to a lack of scale economies, 
are higher for smallholders. In addition, compared 
with foodgrains, high-value food commodities are 
prone to higher price risks. Their prices are volatile 
and drop significantly when supply in the market is 
just slightly above normal.
Lack of infrastructure such roads, refrigerated 
transport, and cold storage is an important barrier 
to farmers' participation in the production and 
marketing of high-value food commodities. Evi­
dence shows that the spread of high-value agricul­
ture is poor in areas with poor road networks 
[Parthasarathy Rao et al. 2006], A lack of road 
connectivity leads to delays in transferring produce 
to market centers, quantitative and qualitative 
losses in farm produce, and higher transportation 
and transaction costs, which act as a disincentive to 
farmers and agroprocessors to invest in high-value 
agricultural production and processing.
Although the globalization of agri-food markets 
presents an opportunity for farmers to participate 
in these markets, globalization is accompanied by
increasing demands for food safety, quality, trace- 
ability, and compliance. Meeting these requirements 
is a big challenge for farmers, processors, and 
exporters. Food safety and quality concerns are 
also echoed by the organized food retail chains in 
domestic markets. Lack of compliance with food 
safety and quality standards may exclude small­
holders from the quality-driven supply chains.
Institutional Innovations Linking Farmers 
to Markets
For smallholders to benefit from the growing 
market opportunities, close linkages between 
farmers, processors, traders, and retailers are 
needed to coordinate supply and demand. Vertical 
coordination of agri-food markets through institu­
tions like cooperatives, producers' associations, and 
contract farming can help create such linkages. 
These institutions, if managed well, can provide 
several benefits to farmers besides access to 
markets. The major benefit consists of reduced 
transportation and transaction costs. Farmers also 
benefit from the provision of high-quality inputs, 
improved technologies, credit, insurance, and sup­
port services from the processing or marketing 
firms provided as a part of contracts.
These institutions are not, however, free from criti­
cism. Although cooperatives and producers' 
organizations offer the benefit of collective 
strength, friction and disputes among the members 
can mar the spirit of cooperation. Contract farming 
is viewed as a partnership between unequal part­
ners, and there is always scope for exploitation of 
the weaker party—that is, the farmers. The agri­
business firms may extract monopsonistic rents in 
the output market and manipulate the terms and 
conditions of contracts to the disadvantage of 
farmers. Another important argument against con­
tract farming is that agribusiness firms, to reduce 
the transaction costs of contracting with a large 
number of smallholders, tend to select large 
farmers who are capable of supplying sufficient 
quantity and complying with food safety and 
quality standards.
Nonetheless, India is witnessing a revolution in 
institutional innovations linking farmers with 
markets [Box 1], Cooperatives among sugarcane and 
dairy producers have long existed. Producers' asso­
ciations for marketing fruits are emerging in their 
niche production regions. And now, with enabling
market liberalization policies, contract farming is 
becoming a preferred method for the sourcing of 
raw materials by agri-business firms, organized food 
retailers, and exporters.
Box 1: The Institutional Revolution in 
High-Value Agriculture:
The Case of Poultry Production
Until 1991, contract farming in poultry was 
almost nonexistent in India. Although 
poultry production was booming, a disease 
outbreak in the mid-1990s in the southern 
part of the country—the heart of the 
poultry industry—forced many smallholders 
to exit poultry production. This production 
decline affected not only producers, but also 
hatcheries and the feed industry. 
Consequently, a few leading firms in the 
poultry business initiated contract farming 
with farmers who had closed their farms. 
The obvious advantage was that these farms 
had infrastructure and skills in poultry 
production and required only operational 
capital, which these firms provided in the 
form of chicks and feed. The farmers were 
provided with guaranteed income in the 
form of fixed growing charges, which acted 
as insurance against market risks. Today, 
contract farming is widely practiced in both 
broilers and layers; about 40 percent of 
India's poultry production takes place under 
contracts, and in some southern and 
western states the share is more than 70 
percent.
The literature on contract farming identifies three 
types of contracts: market specification, resource­
providing, and management contracts.2 All these
2 Under a market specification contract, a farmer com­
mits to sell his produce to the agribusiness firm at a 
fixed price or at the market price prevailing at the time 
of harvest. Under a resource-providing contract, the 
agribusiness firm provides inputs, technology, and 
services to the farmer against his commitment to supply 
a stipulated amount of produce. Under a management 
contract, the agribusiness firm not only provides 
resources but also has strict managerial control over the
contractual arrangements exist in India in varying 
intensity. Market specification contracts, as pre­
harvest contracts, are widely prevalent in horti­
cultural crops like mango, banana, apple, Iitchi, 
grape, arecanut; management contracts are quite 
common in poultry; and resource-providing con­
tracts are observed in most of the commodities.
Within the broad framework of market specifica­
tion, resource-providing, and management con­
tracts, a contract could be bipartite or multipartite, 
depending on the commodity, the resource base of 
the producers, and the capacity of the agribusiness 
firms. A bipartite contract is a direct contract 
between a producer or group of producers and an 
agri-business firm. Poultry contracts in India are 
mostly bipartite management-type contracts. 
Multipartite contracts involve not only farmers and 
agri-business firms, but also many other stake­
holders such as financial institutions [credit and 
insurance], input manufacturers, and service pro­
viders. Given the poor resource endowments of 
smallholders, multipartite contracts are becoming 
important in India. Further, the practice of subcon­
tracting is widely prevalent both in bipartite and 
multipartite contract systems. In this case, the firm 
enters into an agreement with a local villager to 
obtain a commodity supply on a commission basis. 
The local villager acts as an intermediary between 
the firm and the producers in terms of procure­
ment of the produce and distribution of inputs and 
services. In a smallholder-dominated agrarian econ­
omy, such an arrangement reduces the firm's trans­
action cost of contracting with a large number of 
smallholders and also spreads risk. These contracts 
are common in dairying.
Empirical evidence on the profitability of contract 
farming is scanty, yet the available data show that 
farmers, both large and small, benefit from these 
arrangements [Birthal et al. 2005; Kumar 2006], 
Table I shows the percentage difference in costs, 
price, and net revenue between contract and inde­
pendent production of milk, broilers, and spinach.3 
With contracts, dairy and spinach producers can
farmer's decisions and guarantees a minimum income to 
the farmer.
3 Contracts in dairy are of two types: [1] direct contracts 
with large producers, and [2] subcontracting with small 
producers through agents. Broiler contracts are 
management-type contracts, in the case of spinach, 
contracts are through producers' associations. For 
details, refer to Birthal et al. [2005],
Table 1: U nit Cost, Price, and N et Revenue o f Contract Farmers 
Compared with Those o f N oncontract Farmers [% J__________
Item Milk Broilers Spinach
Cost of production -2.5 - -8.9
Marketing and transaction cost -93.1 -57.8 -92.0
Total cost -10.2 - -26.5
Price 3.8 - 7.7
Net revenue 100.5 12.6 77.9
Source: Birthal et al. 2005.
Note: Dashes signify that the data are not comparable.
realize as much as 78-100 percent more net reve­
nue than their independent counterparts selling in 
the open market. The major benefits accrue from 
reduced transportation and transaction costs. With 
off-take of the produce at the farm gate assured, 
contract producers can save on transport, travel, 
and labor costs. Because they are provided with 
inputs [at market prices] and free technical services 
at their doorstep, they also save on the cost of 
acquiring these goods and services. There is no 
significant difference between the contract price 
and the market price, although the contract price is 
marginally higher for both milk and spinach. Thus 
it does not appear that agri-business firms tend to 
extract monopsonistic rent in the output market 
and monopolistic rent in the input market.
Broiler contracts are management-type contracts. 
The agribusiness firms provide day-old chicks, feed, 
vaccines, medicines, and services and thus bear 
about 90 percent of the variable cost, which in a 
sense is an interest-free credit to producers. The 
producers are provided with a guaranteed income 
[in the form of fixed growing charges for birds 
based on body weight] for their contribution to 
production cost. This system eases farmers' capital 
constraints, insulates them from market and price 
risks, and provides stable income [Ramaswami et al. 
2006], Since there is a trade-off between risk and 
returns, contract farming in broilers is not as prof­
itable as in milk and spinach.
Marketing and transaction costs are higher for 
smallholders, and thus they are expected to benefit
most from institutional arrangements. The 
question, however, concerns their participation in 
these arrangements. Evidence in this regard is 
mixed. In the cases presented in Table 1, 56 percent 
of dairy producers had fewer than 5 dairy animals, 
51 percent of spinach producers had a farm smaller 
than 2 ha, and 32 percent of broiler producers had 
fewer than 5,000 birds per crop. In contract 
farming of gherkins, Erappa [2006] found more 
than 50 percent of farmers had less than 2 ha of 
land. On the other hand, Kumar [2006] found very 
little involvement of small landholders in contract 
farming [15 percent] in crop production in general.
Policy Issues
In India smallholders [with landholdings of less than 
2 ha] make a significant contribution to the pro­
duction of high-value food commodities [Birthal 
and Joshi 2006], They control 61 percent of the 
total area under vegetables and 52 percent under 
fruits, compared with their share of 44 percent of 
arable land. Most smallholders do not, however, 
practice high-value agriculture on a commercial 
scale; only 16 percent of them grow vegetables, and 
of these farmers 60 percent allocate less than 20 
percent of their area to vegetables owing to lack of 
market access. Production on such a tiny scale 
might offer nutritional benefits to them, but the 
lack of access to markets largely eliminates cash 
benefits. The major policy issue is therefore how to 
connect them with regional, national, and interna­
tional markets.
Agriculture in India is a state subject. The market­
ing of agricultural produce is governed by the 
state-specific Agricultural Produce Market Commit­
tee [APMC] Acts, which until recently restricted 
commercial transactions in agricultural commodities 
outside the state-designated markets. Under its 
economic reform program, the central government 
came with a new Model Agricultural Marketing 
Act in 2003, which allows allow agribusiness and 
marketing firms to source their raw materials 
directly from farmers through contracts or other 
arrangements. The implementation of the Model 
Agricultural Marketing Act, however, rests with 
state governments, and progress has been slow, 
acting as a disincentive for agribusiness firms to 
invest in marketing and processing infrastructure 
and thus slowing the upscaling of contract farming.
A related issue concerns regulation and legal pro­
tection of contract farming. The Model Agricul­
tural Marketing Act has regulatory provisions but 
does not provide any legal teeth for resolving con­
flicts and disputes between the parties involved, on 
the grounds that legal procedures could be lengthy 
and complex. Nevertheless, contract farming is 
growing rapidly, and the need for legal protection 
cannot be ruled out.
Downstream from this vertical coordination, a sig­
nificant change is taking place in India's food 
retailing system in the form of the rise of super­
markets. A number of large business houses have 
entered organized food retailing. This move is likely 
to have a significant impact on food procurement, 
as well as on traditional retailing systems. Super­
market chains are quality-driven. There is concern 
that smallholders may be unable to meet super­
markets' quantitative and qualitative requirements 
and thus may be displaced from the high-value 
market segment. There is also concern that the rise 
of supermarkets in food retailing could displace 
millions of workers in the unorganized retail food 
sector. On account of these concerns, India prohi­
bits foreign direct investment in multibrand 
retailing. It is also feared that foreign investors may 
import goods into India, which could be detri­
mental to domestic producers.
The food-processing industry is underdeveloped 
and lacks investment. Only about 2.2 percent of 
fruits and vegetables, 6 percent of poultry meat, 21 
percent each of fish and buffalo meat, and 35 
percent of milk undergo value addition [Govern­
ment of India 2005], This low level of processing 
results from both demand- and supply-side factors. 
Prices of processed foods are high owing to the 
high cost of packaging and taxes.4 Moreover, the 
food-processing industry lacks scale economies. 
Improving the scale of processing requires huge 
capital expenditures and investments in technology 
to allow industry to compete in global markets.
With rising incomes and access to information, 
consumers are becoming increasingly conscious of 
food safety and quality. High-value food com­
modities are more prone to food-safety issues at 
every stage of the value chain. Unfortunately, the 
cost of complying with food safety demands is 
exorbitant owing to required higher initial invest­
ments in machinery and equipment, certification 
procedures and labeling, and monitoring and 
enforcement costs at the farm level [Mehta et al. 
2007],
An important issue that has attracted considerable 
attention from policy makers concerns the trade­
offs between high-value crops, food security, and 
natural resources. Some observers fear that divert­
ing land from staples to commercial cultivation of 
high-value crops may adversely affect household 
food and nutrition security. Besides, there is an 
argument that high-value crops require more irri­
gation water, fertilizers, and pesticides and thus 
could lead to a deterioration of natural resources. 
There are counterarguments to these [Birthal et al. 
2006], but this debate creates a dilemma for policy 
makers.
Stakeholders
Stakeholders on the supply chain for high-value 
food products can be broadly categorized as pro­
ducer-sellers [individual or collective], buyers 
[commission agents, wholesalers, institutional 
buyers, processors, exporters, and retail chains], 
consumers, input manufacturers, and service pro­
viders [financial institutions, extension agents, agri­
cultural research institutions, packers, and trans­
porters], All these stakeholders have different 
interests, some of which are complementary and 
others of which are conflicting.
4 For most horticultural products, packaging costs vary 
between 12 and 20 percent of the total cost, and tax 
incidence ranges between 15 and 21 percent.
Producers are the primary stakeholders. Their main 
interest is to have an assured and remunerative 
market for their produce, and they will benefit the 
most from institution-driven supply chains. 
Assured access to markets lowers marketing and 
transaction costs, reduces price risks, and acts as an 
incentive to improve scale of production.
Agroprocessors, organized retailers [supermarkets], 
and exporters are important key actors in creating 
new markets for high-value food products. Institu­
tions like contract farming enable them to have 
quantitative and qualitative control over raw 
material procurement and to use their installed 
capacity, infrastructure, and labor force more effec­
tively. Their main interest is to expand business by 
capturing emerging opportunities in the high-value 
sector. The level of food processing, as well as 
organized food retailing, in India is low, but rising 
demand for high-value foods offers immense 
opportunities to them in agriculture and agri­
business. At present, the supply chain for high- 
value food commodities is long and dominated by a 
number of intermediaries such commission agents, 
wholesalers, and unorganized retailers. Vertical 
coordination through institutional mechanisms 
would lead to increased competition in procure­
ment and retailing systems, benefiting both pro­
ducers [through reduction in market risks] and 
consumers (through lower prices and better 
quality]. On the other hand, vertical coordination 
might squeeze the profits of traditional stake­
holders like commission agents, wholesalers, and 
unorganized food retailers.
High-value agriculture requires capital, improved 
technology, high-quality inputs, information, and 
services, and many farmers lack access to these. 
The new marketing institutions create enormous 
potential for financial institutions, input manufac­
turers, and technology, information, and service 
providers to integrate themselves into the supply 
chain through links with agribusiness firms and 
farmers.
As stakeholders, the central and state governments 
should create a level playing field for the growth of 
new market institutions, promote competition 
among various market players, and enact regula­
tions and legislation to ensure food safety for con­
sumers. They should also encourage smallholders 
to form producers' associations to deal with agri­
business firms; this step can help them avoid being
excluded from markets and improve farmers' access 
to credit, insurance, technology, information, and 
support services to improve competitiveness. In 
addition, the government's role in providing public 
infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, and com­
munication, that generates widespread economic 
benefits is of utmost importance.
Policy Options
Three critical elements that need a policy focus are 
[1] physical infrastructure [such as roads, electricity, 
and communication] that connects smallholders to 
consumption centers and markets; [2] institutions 
that reduce marketing risks and transaction costs 
and provide inputs, technology, information, credit, 
insurance, and support services; and [3] investment 
in food processing.
For perishable commodities, access to high-quality 
and cost-effective transportation is essential to 
reduce marketing risks and transaction costs for 
both sellers and buyers. Hence, governments 
should increasingly invest in rural roads and other 
means of transportation, especially in remote areas 
that have favorable environmental conditions for 
production of high-value commodities but lack 
market access.
There is also a need to invest in electrification, 
which is a prerequisite for production, postharvest 
storage, and processing of high-value commodities. 
In this age of the information revolution, electricity 
is also crucial for the effective use of technologies 
to retrieve and transmit information on production 
and postharvest technologies, management prac­
tices, prices, and markets. This issue raises the role 
of information and communication technologies. 
Lack of access to information is an important 
limitation to commercializing high-value agriculture. 
An uninterrupted supply of electricity and infor­
mation, by reducing unit production costs and 
transaction costs, will improve competitiveness in 
production, marketing, and processing.
Investment in public infrastructure triggers private 
investment in cold storage, refrigerated transporta­
tion, market infrastructure, and processing, which 
are essential to stimulate production of high-value 
food commodities. Unfortunately, both public and 
private investment in such infrastructure is inade­
quate to cope with the ongoing revolution in the
high-value food sector. For instance, the available 
cold storage capacity in India can accommodate 
barely 10 percent of the horticultural produce 
[Birthal et al. 2005], Chilling and storage facilities 
for milk and meat are grossly lacking.
An enabling policy environment is also needed to 
enhance private sector participation in agri-food 
markets. Some important issues that need policy 
attention include reduction of regulatory barriers 
such as the multiplicity of regulatory and licensing 
authorities, increased flow of credit to processors 
and exporters, and reduction of the multiple taxes 
on processed products.
The Government of India allows foreign direct 
investment [FDI] in food processing, but cumber­
some procedures and lack of infrastructure hinder 
this investment. Presently, food processing 
accounts for only 4 percent of total FDI. FDI in 
food retailing is not allowed except in single-brand 
retailing. FDI can promote high-value agriculture by 
creating new markets for processed foods, 
improving scale economies, and linking farmers to 
export markets.
Globalization is creating opportunities to export 
high-value food products but is accompanied by 
stringent food safety and quality standards. To 
exploit these opportunities, India must promote 
public-private partnerships to develop and improve 
quality standards, build food-testing laboratories, 
set up export promotion zones, and equip farmers 
with best production practices.
Diversification toward high-value food commodities 
is demand-driven and sets a demand-driven agenda 
for agricultural research. The research should 
target the development of crop varieties and 
production practices that satiate consumers' tastes, 
preferences, and food safety requirements. In addi­
tion, research should focus on developing crop 
varieties and products that are suitable for 
processing [taking into account, for example, size, 
color, shelf life, and chemical composition) and that 
make use of cost-effective processing technologies.
Given an appropriate macroeconomic policy 
framework, farmers would benefit the most if the 
supply chain is squeezed to reduce marketing costs 
and margins and if farmers are provided with high- 
quality information, improved technologies, credit, 
information, and risk-mitigating instruments. These
goals could be met if agribusiness firms establish 
strong backward linkages with farmers through 
institutions like cooperatives, producers' associa­
tions, and contract farming. Governments should 
therefore facilitate the upscaling of such institu­
tions by accelerating the process of agricultural 
market reform and demonstrating the benefits of 
these institutions to farmers.
Institutional reforms should be accompanied, how­
ever, by appropriate regulations and legal instru­
ments that protect producers from unscrupulous 
trade practices. Two important issues here relate to 
[1] the monopsonistic power of agribusiness firms, 
and [2] exclusion of smallholder farmers from the 
market. Governments must recognize these possi­
bilities and ensure that contracts are transparent, 
unbiased, and not disadvantageous to producers.
Global experience reveals that agribusiness firms 
tend to exclude smallholders from such institutions. 
Although Indian agriculture is numerically domi­
nated by smallholders, the distribution of land is 
highly inegalitarian; 35.6 percent of the land is con­
trolled by 5.2 percent of farm households. Thus, it 
is not difficult for firms to find large landholders 
and contract with them to supply high-value agri­
cultural commodities. The best option to ensure 
that smallholders are not excluded and exploited is 
to encourage them to join together in producer 
organizations, which should be supported by policy 
instruments such as provision of subsidized credit 
and insurance, extension services and information, 
and communication technologies.
Assignment
Cooperatives, producers' associations, and contract 
farming are important means of improving small­
holders' access to markets for high-value food 
commodities. Their success, however, has varied 
across commodities and locations. Your assignment 
is [1] to compare the advantages and disadvantages 
of cooperatives, producers' associations, and con­
tract farming; and (2) to identify required govern­
ment policies and other conditions for the success 
of these institutions, focusing on social, economic, 
and political and legal aspects.
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